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Executive summary
In this report, we argue that despite major changes in the transatlantic security land-
scape, ‘Atlanticism’ has survived as a specific national security orientation on the Euro-
pean political arena and within NATO. However, we also observe that the content and 
implications of Atlanticism seem to have changed. We substantiate this claim through 
an analysis of the security discourse and practices of three long-term European NATO 
members: Britain, Norway and Denmark. While geographical location, historical 
bonds with the United States and Euro-scepticism constituted key indicators of these 
countries’ Atlanti-cist orientation in the Cold War era, their present-day Atlanticism 
seems characterized by their readiness to work together with the United States, and 
to commit troops and equipment to US-led and NATO-led operations. Based on this 
revised definition of Atlanticism, we argue that all three countries have remained 
steady in their orientation as ‘Atlanticists first’. On the other hand, we also note that 
the new administration in Washington and the growing tensions between Russia and 
the West are factors that might reinforce the traditional geopolitical and historical 
aspects of Atlanticism, both within NATO and as part of the security identities of 
European member states. Recent discussions concerning ‘core tasks and areas’ in 
relation to NATO’s new strategic concept could be seen as indicating such a tendency.
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1. Introduction 
In the year of NATO’s 60th anniversary, transatlantic relations find 
themselves at a defining moment. Ever since the end of the Cold War, 
scholars have repeatedly predicted the demise of Atlanticism in 
Europe, and with it, NATO’s position as the cornerstone of its Euro-
pean member-states’ security policies.1 Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, NATO was seen as faced with the choice between trans-
formation and termination – to go ‘out of area’ or ‘out of business’.2 
About a decade later, the US-led intervention of Iraq revealed seem-
ingly ‘deep and unbridgeable divisions’ between key members of the 
transatlantic security community.3 Once again, transatlantic relations 
were put to a severe test. One scholar argued that the transatlantic se-
curity architecture had fallen apart, leading to the effective end of At-
lanticism.4 Others were less conclusive as to the severity and long-
term effects of the crisis.5  
 
In this report, we claim that these rumours of the demise of Atlanti-
cism in European security politics have been exaggerated. On the con-
trary, we argue, Atlanticism appears to have been revitalized, and 
                                                 
 Work on this report has been financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 
We thank officials at NATO HQ level, at the Norwegian, British and Danish 
delegations to NATO and the Norwegian delegation to the EU for taking the 
time to meet with us in Brussels 27–28 October 2008. These, altogether twelve, 
in-depth interviews are used as background sources throughout the report. We 
are indebted to Malene Arboe-Rasmussen at NATO’s Public Diplomacy Divi-
sion for invaluable assistance during our stay in Brussels, and to Jakub God-
zimirski, Iver B. Neumann and Henrik Thune for comments on draft versions. 
Thanks also to Susan Høivik for language assistance. Any errors or shortcom-
ings in this report are our own. This report was finalised during the summer of 
2009. 
1  For a brief summary of the cyclical debates on NATO’s death, see Howorth, 
Jolyon (2003) ‘Esdp and Nato: Wedlock or Deadlock? ’ Cooperation and Con-
flict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association. Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 
1. 
2  As famously stated by US Senator Richard Lugar in 1993: see Lugar, Richard 
(1993) ‘Nato: Out of Area or out of Business. A Call for U.S. Leadership to Re-
vive and Redefine the Alliance’, Speech, Washington D.C., 24 June. 
3  Cornish, Paul (2004) ‘Nato: The Practice and Politics of Transformation’, Inter-
national Affairs. Vol. 80, No. 1, p. 64. 
4  Daalder, Ivo (2003) ‘The End of Atlanticism’, Survival. Vol. 45, No. 2. 
5  For a compilation of different perspectives, see Lundestad, Geir (ed.) (2008) 
Just Another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000, Ox-
ford/New York: Oxford University Press. 
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taken on a new form. With the new US administration of Barack 
Obama, we even expect the growing conditions for Atlanticism to im-
prove further. We approach Atlanticism as a particular type of security 
identity and orientation, intercepting a geographical dimension, a his-
torical dimension and a cautious Europeanist dimension. Our working 
assumption is that recent changes in the international security envi-
ronment have not altered the Atlanticist security identities of long-term 
NATO member-states in Europe, exemplified here by Britain, Norway 
and Denmark. We substantiate this claim by showing that both in key 
situations and over time, and despite significant changes in the interna-
tional security environment, the Atlanticist identities of these three 
countries have remained largely intact. This can be seen both in rheto-
ric and in concrete security practices.  
 
The report consists of three parts: In the first part, we link the concept 
of Atlanticism to the study of security identities and communities, and 
identify three traditionally distinctive characteristics of Atlanticism. 
We then examine how geographical location, historical ties with the 
United States and relations with Europe and the EU have impacted on 
the security identities of Britain, Norway and Denmark since 1945. In 
the second part of the report, we discuss the extent to which changes in 
the international security landscape the last decade have influenced the 
Atlanticist security identities of these countries.  
 
In the third part, we conclude from our analysis that, rather than with-
ering away, Atlanticism seems to be reviving and taking on a new 
form. While geography, historical relations with the United States and 
cautious relations with Europe and the EU remain central indicators of 
Atlanticism, they seem less decisive than before. Instead, Atlanticism 
increasingly seems characterized by the readiness and de facto ability 
to communicate and cooperate with the United States, and to commit 
troops and equipment to US-led and NATO-led operations. Moreover, 
the return of great-power politics to the international stage seems to 
impinge on NATO members’ views on the future role of the Alliance. 
While some Atlanticist countries have held that NATO should return 
to its core tasks and areas, others have maintained that NATO should 
focus more on developing its global role. One key arena where the fu-
ture of Atlanticism might be carved out is in the ongoing discussions 
on NATO’s new strategic concept, scheduled for release in late 2010.
2. Defining Atlanticism 
Atlanticism is a blurry concept, analytically and politically. In this re-
port, we use the term to denote a specific type of security policy iden-
tity and orientation, anchored in geographical location, historical ties 
with the United States and a wary approach to European integration. A 
central question in contemporary IR scholarship is how the security 
identities of modern states come into being and how they are main-
tained. One approach, anchored in a rationalist style of reasoning, has 
been to see the strategic choices of states as structurally determined. 
Their interests and preferences are exogenously given – meaning that 
they can largely be explained with reference to external structures such 
as geopolitics, great-power politics and spheres of interest. From this 
perspective, identities are considered to be of little relevance for ex-
plaining changes in state behaviour. Instead, the ideological concerns 
of states are seen as rooted in structural circumstances, including the 
prevailing distribution of power.6 
 
While such an approach to security politics can be fruitful in many 
cases, it is less so in the context of this project, where the purpose is 
precisely to study potential changes in the seemingly deep-seated At-
lanticist identities of three European NATO members. In view of this, 
our theoretical point of departure in this report is anchored in a con-
structivist style of reasoning, in which security identities are seen as 
changeable and continually subject to influence from changing actors 
and structures in their environment. These security identities, in turn, 
are held to ‘generate and shape’ both security interests and behaviour.7 
As argued by Lene Hansen,  
 
                                                 
6  Rationalism is often seen to encompass different variants of realist and liberal 
approaches, including realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neo-liberalism and lib-
eral institutionalism. These theories have in common that they (albeit to differ-
ing degrees) emphasize the anarchic nature of international politics and the ma-
terialist interests of states (including security, power and economic gains). For 
an overview see Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt (2002) ‘Rationalism V. 
Constructivism: A Sceptical View’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and 
Beth A. Simmons, (eds.) Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage.  
7  Jepperson, Ronald J., Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein (1996) ‘Norms, 
Identity and Culture in National Security’, in Peter Katzenstein, (ed.) The Cul-
ture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press. 
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 […] representations of identity place foreign policy issues within a particular 
interpretative optic, one with consequences for which foreign policy can be for-
mulated as an adequate response.8  
 
In other words, identity sets the framework conditions for and action 
space within foreign policy. This should be observable at both the 
formulation and the execution level of the security politics of our three 
countries. The notion of security communities – clusters of states 
‘glued together’ by a notion of shared history, perceptions, values and 
destiny – is also useful to consider in this regard. According to 
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, national security identities and 
practices are profoundly shaped by such communities.9  
 
In this report, we define NATO as a security community. As argued by 
Mike Williams and Iver B. Neumann, this security community results 
from ‘a deep, enduring and profound cultural commonality’, rather 
than from the Cold War.10 When the Cold War ended and NATO’s 
relevance and indeed existence came to be questioned, then Secretary-
General Manfred Wörner stressed that the Treaty of Washington 
(1949) had aimed at creating ‘a permanent community of Western de-
mocracies to make each other stronger through cooperation, and to 
work for more peaceful international relations’, and not at deterring 
the Soviet Union.11 In the post-Cold War era, an important mission for 
NATO has been to reconcile former adversaries by enlarging its secu-
rity community through new members and partners. In addition, 
NATO represents the strongest institutional link between Europe and 
the United States, and that has contributed to its continued relevance 
after 1990. In such a representation of the alliance, the military balanc-
ing during the Cold War stands out as an anomaly, an unfortunate his-
torical deviation from NATO’s real nature and identity.12  
 
Atlanticism has been and remains an important connective tissue in 
NATO. Broadly speaking, Atlanticism can be defined as the ‘common 
                                                 
8  Hansen, Lene (2006) Security as Practice. Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian 
War, London: Routledge. 
9  Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (eds.) (1998) Security Communities, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. The concept of security communities was 
introduced by Deutsch, Karl W. (1957) Political Community and the North At-
lantic Area; International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
10  Williams, Michael C. and Iver B. Neumann (2000) 'From Alliance to Security 
Community: Nato, Russia and the Power of Identity', Millennium: Journal of In-
ternational Studies. Vol. 29, No. 2, p. 368. 
11  Quoted in Williams and Neumann ‘From Alliance to Security Community: 
Nato, Russia and the Power of Identity’, p. 368. 
12  Williams and Neumann ‘From Alliance to Security Community: Nato, Russia 
and the Power of Identity’. 
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heritage and a shared destiny’ of all the states bordering the North At-
lantic.13 In a more limited sense, however, it can be seen as a collective 
term for the identities of European NATO members who wish to en-
sure US involvement in Europe and safeguard NATO’s position as the 
cornerstone of European security and defence policy. Hence, Atlanti-
cism must be seen in close connection with the US influence on world 
politics in general since 1945, and on the security identities of Euro-
pean countries in particular. From this latter definition, Atlanticism is 
seen as the counterpart to ‘Europeanism’ or ‘continentalism’, which 
aims at reducing US influence in Europe by promoting a more inde-
pendent security role for the EU.14  
 
In this report, we focus on three long-term Atlanticist countries in 
NATO: Britain, Denmark and Norway. For all these three, Atlanticism 
can be said to involve a geographical location bordering the Atlantic 
Ocean, historically close ties with the United States and a cautious ap-
proach to European integration.15 Britain, Denmark and Norway are all 
located near the North Atlantic. Historically, they have all enjoyed 
close relations with the United States, bilaterally and through NATO. 
They were all founding members of NATO, and have all consistently 
referred to NATO as the centrepiece of their security and defence pol-
icy over the last 60 years. This has been observable at the policy level 
through varying degrees of political and military dependence upon, 
commitment to and cooperation with the Atlantic hegemon. They have 
                                                 
13  Hodge, Carl Cavanagh (2004) Atlanticism for a New Century. The Rise, Tri-
umph and Decline of Nato, Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall. p. 2. For 
an example of how this is expressed at the national level, see Forsvarsdeparte-
mentet (2004) Styrke Og Relevans. Strategisk Konsept for Forsvaret, Oslo: 
Forsvarsdepartementet. pp. 38-39. 
14  As argued for instance by Dunne, Tim (2004) ‘‘When the Shooting Starts’: At-
lanticism in the British Security Strategy’, International Affairs. Vol. 80, No. 5. 
15  In a 2003 study of EU member-states’ positions on the Iraq war, Menon and 
Lipkin identified three different types of Atlanticism in Europe. Traditional At-
lanticists have stable, long-term relations with the NATO and the United States. 
Britain, Portugal and Denmark are cited as examples. Conjunctional Atlanticists, 
in contrast, are less predictable in their preference for the United States and 
NATO. The authors place Spain and Italy in this group. Finally, reflex Atlanti-
cists do not have a tradition of putting the United States and NATO at the centre 
of their security policy, but because of their (communist) pasts they tend to side 
with the United States. Examples include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary. Following this logic, NATO’s enlargement in 2004 and 2009 would yield 
nine more countries as potential candidates to the list of reflex Atlanticists. See 
Menon, Anand and Jonathan Lipkin (2003) European Attitudes Towards Trans-
atlantic Relations 2000-2003: An Analytical Survey, Paris: Notre Europe. Nor-
way was not included in the original study, but fit the criteria for being a tradi-
tional Atlanticist; see Græger, Nina (2005) ‘Norway between NATO, the EU 
and the US: A Case Study of Post-Cold War Security and Defence Discourse’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1. 
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also been reluctant to participate actively in efforts to strengthen secu-
rity cooperation within the structures of the EU. In the following sub-
sections we elaborate on these three aspects of Atlanticism. 
2.1. The geographical dimension of Atlanticism 
Although geographical proximity to the Atlantic Ocean seems less 
central than before in the self-definition as an Atlanticist, it could still 
be argued that Atlanticism in the traditional sense is essentially a geo-
graphical identity.16 In fact, the continued existence of ‘Atlanticism’ as 
a concept in the transatlantic security community indicates that geog-
raphy remains an important signifier in NATO. Furthermore, name 
tags such as ‘Club Med’ for NATO countries like Spain, Portugal and 
Italy, and the ‘Northwest Club’ for the United States, Canada, Britain, 
Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, signify that these countries 
share views and policies on a range of political and strategic issues in 
NATO that can be ascribed at least partly to geographical location. 
Thus, geography could be seen as a sub-layer of Atlanticism.  
 
With the enlargement of NATO to include Eastern and Central Euro-
pean states, the emergence of more such ‘clubs’ is possible, and that 
might challenge the force of Atlanticism within NATO. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that many of the new Eastern and Central 
European members could serve to strengthen the Atlanticist dimension 
in NATO. For many of these countries, Atlanticism has become syn-
onymous with anti-Russian orientations and/or pro-American and pro-
NATO policies. Illustratively, the first Atlanticist organization in East-
ern Europe, the Bulgarian Atlantic Club, was initiated as early as in 
1990, as a think-tank dedicated to fostering the common values of the 
Euro-Atlantic community. Since then, other similar ventures have fol-
lowed. Some of these think-tanks have arguably also introduced a 
genuinely ‘new Atlanticism’, characterized as:  
 
 […] an honest and successful internationalism, which could be used to prevent a 
return to nationalism and could replace the failed Communist internationalism in 
an era when interdependence was on the rise. Thus, they have managed to free 
their Atlanticism from Cold War assumptions, in a way that even NATO would 
envy.17  
 
                                                 
16  Except for Luxembourg, all the original European NATO member states border 
the Atlantic. Among the non-Europeans, the United States and Canada also fit 
the bill. Yet, it should be noted that a country like France, while bordering the 
Atlantic, does not conform to the other characteristics of an Atlanticist country. 
17  Straus, Ira Louis (2009) ‘A Bulgarian Should Head Nato’, Atlantic-
Community.org, 26 March.  
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The various Atlantic clubs and councils established in the former East 
Bloc countries would seem important for upholding and strengthening 
a self-image as Atlanticist.18  
 
Geopolitics – defined as the impact of geographical location, size and 
resources on politics – was the benchmark of security policy during 
the Cold War, with two blocs poised against each other and with proxy 
wars underway in several parts of the world. In contrast, the 1990s 
were marked by intra-state conflicts in Europe and elsewhere, in which 
asymmetric warfare dominated. In this period, the geographical di-
mension of Atlanticism seemed to become less relevant.  
 
Our three country cases illustrate well how geography can be seen as 
constitutive of Atlanticism. Britain’s Atlanticist orientation is often put 
in the context of its geographical location as an island in the North At-
lantic, physically disconnected from the European continent. Britain’s 
traditionally firm preference for the United States and NATO over 
European alternatives in security and defence has, for instance, been 
seen in connection with the country’s vulnerability to attacks by air 
and sea rather than land – as became evident during the Second World 
War. Britain’s dependence on air and naval defence capabilities is 
commonly cited as a key reason why the United States after 1945 was 
deemed a more valuable ally than the countries of central Europe.19 In 
the post-Cold War era, geographical location has largely disappeared 
from the British security and defence discourse. While the British 
Ministry of Defence notes that bordering the Atlantic Ocean continues 
to imprint on British security politics, its 1998 Strategic Defence Re-
view concludes that Britain is no longer facing any immediate ‘threat 
of an air or other direct [military] attack’ on British territory. Instead, 
British security and prosperity are increasingly seen as interlinked with 
security challenges overseas, and non-military threats are given more 
attention than previously.20  
 
Norway’s geographical location, bordering the Atlantic Ocean and, 
especially, the Soviet Union, was the main reason for the country’s 
Atlanticist orientation and close relationship with the United States 
                                                 
18  These clubs were inspired by the West-European Atlantic committees and coun-
cils under The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA). ATA is an umbrella organi-
zation and an independent forum for political discussions about security policy 
and NATO and for supporting the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty. 
See http://www.ata-sec.org/index.php?mod=2. 
19  Blackwell, Michael (1993) Clinging to Grandeur. British Attitudes and Foreign 
Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War, London: Greenwood Press. p. 
77. 
20  See Ministry of Defence (1998) ‘Strategic Defence Review’, London, Ministry 
of Defence, July. 
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after the Second World War. As formulated in 1981 by then prime 
minister Gro Harlem Brundtland: ‘Norway is a country with her back 
to Europe and facing the Atlantic’. More than a geographical descrip-
tion, this statement can be said to have captured a state of mind. 21 Ge-
ography is a defining concept or marker of Norway’s security policy 
identity, reflected in the centrality of Russian politics and Northern 
Norway in national debates about security and defence, and Norway’s 
close relationship with the United States. The heavy focus on the High 
North, in 2005 defined as the core policy area in the coalition govern-
ment’s (2005–2009) political platform, indicates that Atlanticism has 
remained central in Norwegian security and defence policy and iden-
tity.22  
 
Denmark is, like Norway and Britain, located in Europe’s Northern 
periphery and on the Atlantic. Its relatively accessible terrain, with no 
‘natural’ barriers like mountains, makes the country difficult to defend 
against an external aggressor. During the Cold War, this geographical 
fact contributed to Danish NATO membership and to a close relation-
ship with the United States. However, because of its vulnerable geo-
graphical position and frontline location, during the Cold War Den-
mark chose a more low-key détente orientation in NATO, or repressed 
version of Atlanticism, than Norway.23 This position was discarded in 
favour of a ‘mainstream Atlanticism’ in the 1990s.24 
2.2. The historical dimension of Atlanticism 
A second key dimension of Atlanticism relates to the historical ties 
established between the United States and Europe, and between the 
United States and individual European countries, during the two world 
wars and in the Cold War era, in many cases even earlier. Many of the 
European countries that today are seen as having an Atlanticist orienta-
tion have long-standing, bilateral relationships with the United States 
that originated in imperial relations (Britain) or in immigration to 
North America in the 19th and early 20th centuries ( Denmark and 
                                                 
21  Brundtland, Gro Harlem (1981) Norway in the Pattern of Us-European Rela-
tions, Oslo: NUPI. p. 2. See also Græger, Nina and Halvard Leira (2005) ‘Nor-
wegian Strategic Culture after World War Ii: From a Local to a Global Perspec-
tive’, Cooperation and Conflict. Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 47. 
22  Utenriksdepartementet (2006) Regjeringens Nordområdestrategi, Oslo: Uten-
riksdepartementet; Forsvarsstudien (2007) Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2007 
Sluttrapport, Oslo; Forsvarsdepartementet (2007-08) Et Forsvar til vern om 
Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier, Oslo: Forsvarsdepartementet. 
23  Mouritzen, Hans (2007) ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’, Journal of Transatlan-
tic Studies. Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 156. 
24  Ibid. 
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Norway). After 1945, European countries were indebted to the United 
States for coming to their rescue in the Second World War. After the 
war, a number of European countries, including Britain, Norway and 
Denmark, benefited greatly from the US Marshall Plan in their post-
war economic reconstruction. Atlanticism in this sense can thus be 
seen to involve also a reciprocal aspect, the consent of the United 
States to play a role as a guardian of Europe and of the security and 
prosperity of individual European states. 
 
Both pre-war history and wartime experiences and cooperation consti-
tuted a fundamental backdrop to the establishment of NATO in 1949. 
At the time, security was the driving force in the establishment of 
NATO – it was about keeping ‘the Americans in, the Russians out and 
the Germans down’.25 During the Cold War, the United States was, 
through NATO, the undisputed guarantor of its European allies’ ‘terri-
torial integrity, political independence and security’.26 US basing strat-
egy throughout the Cold War yearss, which also constituted a central 
part of NATO’s defence strategy, was based on the wartime coopera-
tion among ‘the Allies’. In addition to these bilateral agreements about 
the pre-stocking of US military equipment on their territories,27 the 
United States and individual allies in Europe were linked through ex-
tensive cooperation on procurement, military education exchange pro-
grammes, and military and foreign policy matters more generally.  
 
Regarding the three country cases, the historical context for British 
Atlanticism was above all the decline of Britain’s imperial power 
around 1940, with the subsequent transfer of global hegemony to the 
United States. By the time NATO was founded, Britain’s position as 
major world power was fading, while the United States and the Soviet 
Union had gained comparative strength. In 1946, Winston Churchill 
launched the idea of a ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the 
United States for the first time,28 effectively establishing the pivotal 
position of the United States in British politics for the next half-
century. While Churchill later stressed that British foreign policy took 
                                                 
25  A quote commonly attributed to NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay.  
26  As carved out in Article V of The North Atlantic Treaty. NATO (1949) ‘The 
North Atlantic Treaty’, Washington. 
27  While Norway had explicit restrictions with regard to bases and the storage of 
nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil or in foreign ships in Norwegian harbours 
(see Riste, Olav (2001) Norway’s Foreign Relations - a History, Oslo: Univer-
sitetsforlaget.), the US had its own base at Keflavik in Iceland until 2007. For an 
analysis of US basing strategies, see Cooley, Alexander and Daniel H. Nexon 
(2007) ‘Bases of Empire: Globalization and the Politics of U.S. Overseas Bas-
ing’, Oslo, NUPI, 6 November. 
28  Churchill, Winston (1946) ‘Sinews of Peace’, Speech given at the Westminster 
College, 5 March  
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place on three arenas – the British Commonwealth and Empire, ‘the 
English-speaking world’ and ‘United Europe – it soon became clear 
that the United States took precedence over other partners. Not only 
had the United States’ entry into the Second World War proved deci-
sive for the victory of the Allies and for British security, but the his-
torical bonds between the two countries and, because of this, similari-
ties in language, culture and political system, seemed to have created a 
solid platform for cooperation.29  
 
The idea that Britain enjoyed a ‘special’ bilateral bond with the United 
States gained a foothold in the British security discourse during the 
Cold War. Today, paying tribute to ‘the special relationship’ is cus-
tomary when British and US leaders visit and address one another.30 
Recent British white papers on security and defence confirm the 
United States’ position as Britain’s most important bilateral partner, 
and NATO’s role as the ‘bedrock’ of British security and defence.31 
Indeed, the firm bonds with the United States largely explain why it 
made sense for Britain to promote the idea of a strong transatlantic de-
fence alliance on the European arena, formally committing the United 
States to the defence of European and British territory. Since the be-
ginning, Britain has been an influential player in NATO, setting the 
tone both politically and militarily. Out of NATO’s twelve official 
Secretaries General, three have been British.32 Britain is also a key 
contributor to NATO in terms of expenditures and personnel, includ-
ing to NATO operations.33 However, British-US security cooperation 
goes beyond NATO. On a bilateral basis and within the so-called ‘An-
glosphere’, it includes military training, procurement, intelligence and 
the sharing of military bases.34 
                                                 
29  For an overview of the historic relations between Britain and the United States, 
see Burk, Kathleen (2007) Old World, New World. The Story of Britain and 
America, London: Little, Brown and Company; Campbell, Duncan Andrew 
(2007) Unlikely Allies. Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special 
Relationship, London/New York: Hambledon Continuum. 
30  According to inside sources, Bill Clinton had to be reminded of this prior to his 
first press meeting with John Major, in 1993. ‘How could I forget? The “special 
relationship”!’, Clinton reportedly said while laughing heartily. Quoted in Burk 
Old World, New World. The Story of Britain and America, p. 644. 
31  See for instance Ministry of Defence ‘Strategic Defence Review’; Ministry of 
Defence (2001) ‘Multinational Defence Cooperation’, London, Ministry of De-
fence, February. 
32  Hastings Ismay (1952–1957), Peter Carrington (1984–1988) and George 
Robertson (1999–2003). The list of NATO Secretaries General includes three 
Dutchmen, two Belgians, an Italian, a German, a Spaniard and a Dane. 
33  http://uknato.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-in-nato/uk-contribution-to-nato 
34  The Anglosphere is common term for the five English-speaking countries: Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Secu-
rity cooperation among these five includes the ABCA Armies’ Program (armed 
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The Atlanticism of Norway and Denmark is generally understood in 
the context of security. Both countries followed a neutral foreign pol-
icy strategy after the First World War, but were nonetheless invaded 
by Nazi Germany in April 1940. The Danish government and Royal 
Family chose to surrender and were, as a result, allowed to remain in 
control of internal Danish affairs. In contrast, the Norwegian govern-
ment and King Haakon VII refused to accept the Nazi occupation; they 
escaped to London, where they formed an exile government.35 Norwe-
gian military resistance lasted for approximately two months before 
Germany gained political control over the country. The decision to 
join NATO in 1949 can hardly be seen as a ‘reflex choice’ on the part 
of either Norway or Denmark. In both countries ‘Never again 9 April!’ 
(referring to the date of the German invasion) put an end to the domi-
nant position that to ‘lie low’ was the best option for a small country.36 
For Norway, organized collaboration with the United States and the 
other NATO countries could easily be perceived as a provocation in 
Moscow. NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, summarized 
Norway and Denmark’s entry into NATO as follows: 
 
 The position of Denmark and Norway in relation to the Treaty had been uncer-
tain. The separate Scandinavian Pact, which they had been engaged in negotiat-
ing, had fallen through because the Swedish policy of full neutrality could not be 
reconciled with Norway’s insistence that any Scandinavian defence association 
would have to co-operate with the Western Powers. On the 5th February, the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Harvard Lange, started for Washington to en-
quire about the Atlantic Treaty. A few hours before leaving Oslo he was handed a 
note from the Soviet Union inviting Norway to conclude a non-aggression pact. 
Norway made her choice. It was a brave one. She declined the Russian offer, and 
on the 3rd March decided to join the Atlantic Alliance, while making it clear that 
she would not allow armed forces of foreign Powers to be stationed on Norwe-
gian territory as long as the country had not been attacked, or threatened with at-
tack. Norway then took part in the latter stages of the negotiations.37 
                                                 
forces), AUSCANNZUKUS (naval sector), the Air and Space Interoperability 
Council (ASIC) (air forces) and the UKUSA community (intelligence). 
35  Before and during the inter-war period, Britain was Norway’s closest ally. Brit-
ain’s declining power status contributed to Norway choosing the United States 
as its primary ally. It should also be mentioned that the Norwegian Royal Fam-
ily, except for King Haakon, spent all the wartime occupation years from 1940 
to 1945 in the United States, on the invitation of President F.D. Roosevelt. The 
Royal Family’s friendship with the President and the First Lady may well also 
account for the close political relationship that developed between the two coun-
tries after the war.   
36  On Denmark, see Stahl, Bernhard et al. (2004) ‘Understanding the Atlanticist-
Europeanist Divide in the Cfsp: Comparing Denmark, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands’, European Foreign Affairs Review. Vol. 9. On Norway, see Riste, 
Riste Norway’s Foreign Relations - a History. 
37  Ismay, Hastings Lionel (1954) Nato, the First Five Years, 1949-1954, Brussels: 
NATO. p. 10. 
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As noted above, Norway and Denmark had clear restrictions related to 
the presence of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases on their 
territories in peacetime. The only exception was Greenland, where 
Denmark granted the United States basing rights, including the right to 
store nuclear weapons. Denmark was lagging behind in the armament 
process in NATO in the early 1950s and stood out as unwilling to in-
crease its defence budget. Norway, while not escaping criticism en-
tirely, was seen as more ‘constructive’. This could also be ascribed to 
the fact that the Norwegian government-in-exile had participated in 
Allied cooperation in London during the war.38 The notion of an ‘alli-
ance within the alliance’ was often used to describe the close relation-
ship between Norway and the United States in NATO during the Cold 
War.39 Later, Denmark’s ‘footnote policy’ between 1982 and 1988, 
when a parliamentary majority in the Folketing forced the minority 
government to opt out from NATO policy on nuclear and arms control 
(through footnotes to NATO communiqués), placed Denmark among 
the ‘backbenchers’ in NATO. During the same period, Norway en-
joyed an important position as NATO’s ‘watchtower’ in the North, on 
the Soviet border.40  
 
Norway’s foreign policy predisposition is towards Atlanticism, mani-
fested in strong ties with the United States and loyalty to NATO. 
NATO is seen as the cornerstone of Norwegian security, with the 
commitments under Article 5 as the means of securing allied and espe-
cially US assistance in case of an armed attack. While security remains 
important in legitimizing and explaining Norway’s Atlanticism, its his-
toric foundation – the  ‘common heritage and a shared destiny’41 with 
the other countries that constitute the (trans-)Atlantic security commu-
nity, and with the United States in particular – has become more 
prevalent. Norwegian authorities often emphasize that this ‘community 
of destiny’ was in place long before the creation of NATO, as common 
cultural bonds and values between Norway and the United States were 
established during the large-scale Norwegian emigration to North 
America in the 19th century: 
 
 Norway has through the years had a special relationship with the USA. This is 
about basic economic, political and security policy relations constituted by count-
                                                 
38  Skogrand, Kjetil (2004) Norsk Forsvarshistorie 1940-1970. Alliert I Krig Og 
Fred, Bergen: Eide forlag. p. 226. 
39  Tamnes, Rolf (1997) Oljealder 1965-1995. Norsk Utenrikspolitikks Historie, 
Oslo: Universitetsforlaget., p. 61. 
40  Tamnes Oljealder 1965-1995. Norsk Utenrikspolitikks Historie. 
41  Hodge Atlanticism for a New Century. The Rise, Triumph and Decline of Nato, 
p. 2. 
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less family ties between Norwegians and Americans of Norwegian ancestry. We 
are building on close historical bonds and shared basic democratic values.42  
 
Because of its historical roots, there is little room for questioning the 
‘special relationship’ that Norway is seen to enjoy with the United 
States, even in times of political disagreement. During the Iraq crisis, 
for instance, when criticism of US policy was harsh among central 
Norwegian politicians, the government stressed that the country’s bi-
lateral relationship with the United States: ‘builds on basic mutual de-
pendency and common values that go deeper than politics and econ-
omy. […] The old community of destiny from the Cold War is 
changed but not gone’.43 Norway’s Atlanticist foreign policy orienta-
tion is deeply rooted and not easily challenged, let alone changed.  
 
In Denmark, the Bush Administration’s Iraq intervention had less im-
pact on the relationship with the United States – in the eyes of the gov-
ernment. In Danish public opinion, however, Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen and his government’s unconditional support for 
Bush’s policy unleashed heated debate and criticism. 
2.3 The ‘cautious Europeanist’ dimension of Atlanticism 
A third dimension of Atlanticism can be referred to as its ‘Other’, 
namely Europeanism. The distinction between Atlanticism and Euro-
peanism (or ‘continentalism’) in West European foreign and security 
policy was frequently made during the Cold War. In response to conti-
nentalism, smaller European states like Norway, Denmark and Iceland 
sought to balance the power of the European great powers through At-
lanticism. A hegemon and ally located ‘far away’ (the United States) 
could seem preferable to the hegemony exercised by powerful Euro-
pean neighbours (like France) so much in evidence in the European 
integration process. From this viewpoint, tying the United States to 
Europe through Atlantic cooperation was portrayed as political balanc-
ing, based on the wish to prevent marginalization of influence, rather 
than threat balancing.44 Traditionally, Britain has been seen as the 
main representative of Atlanticism in NATO, whereas France has been 
the foremost advocate of Europeanism or continentalism. 
 
                                                 
42  Utenriksdepartementet (2001) ‘USA-Strategi’, Oslo, Utenriksdepartementet, 5 
October 2001. 
43   Forsvarsdepartementet Styrke og relevans. Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret, pp. 
38-39. The authors’ translation from Norwegian. 
44  This was underlined by, among others, Henry Kissinger in 1965, see Mouritzen 
‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’, p. 158. 
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When NATO was established, the European integration process had 
already begun. Here too, security played a central part. A key motiva-
tion for establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
in 1951 was the belief that closer economic interdependence among 
the member-states could help to prevent another world war. Plans for 
closer and more coordinated security cooperation among the European 
countries also flourished, the stated aim being that Europe should be 
able to take on more responsibility for its own peace and security. Af-
ter the Cold War, when NATO transformed itself militarily and politi-
cally, a parallel transformation process took place within what was 
then the European Community (EC). In 1991, the NATO countries 
agreed to establish a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 
within the structures of the Alliance. This move was commonly seen 
as indicating US consent for Europe to assume greater responsibility 
for the security of its own ‘backyard’.45 By the turn of the century, the 
final steps to establish a European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) within the EU were completed. In view of this, many scholars 
have claimed to see a ‘Europeanization’ of the security and defence 
identities of some NATO countries as a result of the ESDP – also in 
non-EU members like Norway.46 The United States has been in favour 
of the ESDP as long as it does not threaten NATO’s position as cor-
nerstone of European defence, and as long as NATO retains the ‘first 
right’ to operations, as established implicitly through the 2003 Berlin 
Plus agreement. 
 
Britain’s historical relationship with Europe, and with France in par-
ticular, has been marked by rivalry, conflict and estrangement.47 To-
gether with Britain’s island position outside the European continent, 
this turbulent relationship constitutes an important part of British ex-
ceptionalism: the idea that, due to its history, geography, culture and 
national identity, Britain is different from the rest of Europe.48 Chur-
chill famously voiced this when he declared that Britain was ‘with 
Europe, but not of it’ – ‘linked, but not combined’ and ‘interested and 
                                                 
45  Forster, Anthony and William Wallace (2000) ‘Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. From Shadow to Substance?’ in Helen Wallace and William Wallace, 
(eds.) Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
p. 483.                                                                                                                                                              
46  See for instance Rieker, Pernille (2005) Europeanization of National Security 
Identity. The Eu and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States, New 
York/London: Routledge; Haugevik, Kristin M. (2006b) ‘Middelvei Med Fransk 
‘Touche’: Fransk-Britiske preferanser for EUs sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk’, 
Internasjonal politikk. Vol. 64, No. 4. 
47  See for instance Schama, Simon (2003) A History of Britain 1776-2000. The 
Fate of Empire., Woodlands: BBC Books. pp. 379-380. 
48  Ash, Timothy Garton (2001) ‘Is Britain European?’ International Affairs. Vol. 
77, No. 1. 
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associated, but not absorbed’.49 In addition, anti-federalist sentiments 
were and continue to be strong in Britain, which can help to explain its 
preference for strictly intergovernmental cooperation in Europe. Along 
with Britain’s strategic decision to preserve its wartime security alli-
ance with the United States, this mind-set sheds light on why Britain 
initially chose a ‘wait-and-see’ approach to the European integration 
project. Although the British Foreign Secretary at the time, Ernst 
Bevin, was among the first to propose a ‘western union’ between core 
European states in the mid-1940s, he did so with the blessing of the 
US administration. Eventually, Britain remained outside both the 
ECSC and later the EC.50 Even after Britain finally joined the Com-
munity in 1973, it maintained a reputation for being ‘an awkward part-
ner’ on the European arena.51 Since then, maintaining the balance be-
tween being an active player in Europe and a loyal Atlanticist has been 
a recurrent dilemma for British governments. While British state lead-
ers from Harold Wilson to John Major had varying strategies for how 
Britain best could manoeuvre between Europe and the United States, 
Britain’s identity as an Atlanticist first and a European second largely 
remained stable throughout the Cold War.  
 
Norway’s relationship with Europe and the EU integration process has, 
like that of Britain, been somewhat strained. With two negative refer-
enda (in 1972 and 1994) on Norwegian EEC/EU membership, and 
opinion polls that continue to show a considerable majority against 
Norway joining the Union, few expect the country to become an EU 
member in the near future. Since 1994, Norwegian governments of 
various political colours have defined EU membership as a non-issue, 
and have instead conducted a policy of active adjustment and accom-
modation as part of the European Economic Agreement (EEA) and on 
a case-by-case basis in relation to the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and within Justice and Home Affairs.52 Norway has, for in-
stance, participated in ESDP operations as far as the EU permits and 
by stretching the 1994 referendum mandate.53 In the Norwegian dis-
                                                 
49  Churchill ‘Sinews of Peace’. 
50  In the late 1950s, Britain applied for membership twice, together with Ireland, 
Denmark and Norway. Yet, France’s President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the 
British application both times, reportedly because he had doubts about Britain’s 
commitment to the European project.  
51  See George, Stephen (1998) An Awkward Partner. Britain in the European Un-
ion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
52   In 2006, the government launched an action plan aimed at pursuing a more sys-
tematic and efficient policy towards the EU in those areas where Norway has 
access, notably the EEA and the Schengen Agreement; see ‘On the implementa-
tion of the policy on Europe’, White Paper no. 23 (2005–06). Oslo: The Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs. 
53  For an analysis of Norway’s relations with the ESDP, see Græger, Nina (2007a) 
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course, the dominant view is that participation in the ESDP has few 
direct security and defence policy implications for Norway. Norway’s 
support for the ESDP (e.g. in NATO) is rather based on the idea that a 
stronger European defence capability would strengthen the transatlan-
tic relationship and overall Euro-Atlantic crisis management capac-
ity.54 The government expressed similar attitudes in response to the 
European Security Strategy of 2003, which was seen as ‘a useful con-
tribution to improve transatlantic relations.’55 This is very close to the 
US premises for accepting ESDP as a European – but not exclusively 
EU – project independent of NATO. The transatlantic framing of 
ESDP also reflects Norway’s enduring focus on transatlantic relations 
in the context of European and national security. 
 
Although Denmark joined the EC with Britain in 1973, membership 
has not changed its fundamental predisposition to Atlanticist foreign 
policy. As mentioned above, Denmark turned in the 1990s from a re-
pressed version of Atlanticism (as expressed in the ‘footnote policy’) 
and became a mainstream Atlanticist.56 While not wishing to embrace 
a Europe dominated by Germany and France, Denmark has supported 
Europeanism in the form of EU (and NATO) enlargement. With re-
gard to its EU membership, Denmark opted out of several policy areas 
when the integration process was deepened with the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992. As in non-member Norway and in ‘cautious’ EU member 
states such as the UK and Ireland, this reflected scepticism towards 
European federalism and the pooling of sovereignty in core policy ar-
eas of the nation state.57 The Danish opt-out on foreign and security 
policy in connection with the Maastricht Treaty and its subsequent opt-
out of the ESDP, were also due to concerns about the role of NATO.58 
The ‘US connection’ and Washington’s disapproval of a European se-
curity and defence policy outside NATO also played into this. Argua-
                                                 
‘Norway between Europe and the US ‘, in Clive Archer, (ed.) New Security Is-
sues in Northern Europe: The Nordic and Baltic States and the Esdp. London: 
Routledge. 
54  Utenriksdepartementet (2000-01) ‘Norge Og Europa Ved Inngangen Til Et Nytt 
Århundre’, Oslo, Utenriksdepartementet. 
55  Petersen, Jan (2003) ‘Sikkerhetspolitisk Samarbeid I Europa Eller over Atlanter-
havet? Ja Takk, Begge Deler’, Speech, Oslo, Oslo Militære Samfund, 13 Octo-
ber. 
56  Mouritzen ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’. 
57  Larsen, Henrik (2002) ‘Denmark and the EU’s Defence Dimension: Opt-out 
across the Board?’ in Nina Græger, Henrik Larsen, and Hanna Ojanen, (eds.) 
The ESDP and the Nordic Countries: Four Variations on a Theme. Hel-
sinki/Berlin: Finnish Institute of International Affairs/Institut für Europäische 
Politik. 
58  The Danish opt-out of CFSP/ESDP was formalised in the ‘Protocol on the Posi-
tion of Denmark’, annexed to the Maastricht Treaty. European Council (1992) 
‘Treaty on European Union’, Maastricht, 7 February. 
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bly, after the Cold War, Denmark shifted from NATO ‘footnote’ to 
EU ‘footnote’.59  
 
As in Britain and Norway, Atlanticism is a central feature of Den-
mark’s foreign-policy orientation and identity, irrespective of the gov-
ernment in power. The importance attached to this Atlanticism may 
differ from time to time, however. Denmark’s recent propensity to 
support US foreign policy, even when this policy is highly controver-
sial (as during the Iraq crisis), is the primary expression of its Atlanti-
cist identity.  
                                                 
59  See for instance Rieker, Pernille (2003) Europeanisation of Nordic Security. The 
EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States, Oslo: University 
of Oslo. p. 186. 

3. Atlanticism in the 21st century:  
Responding to a changing security 
landscape 
The end of the Cold War altered not only the international security en-
vironment but also the security practices of Western European coun-
tries and the security organizations to which they belonged. In the 
early 1990s, a new security role was gradually fashioned for NATO, 
involving new tasks and new operational theatres. The Alliance’s 1991 
New Strategic Concept made it clear that NATO was no longer to en-
gage itself only in the military defence of its member-states: it should 
also face up to broader and more complex threats in order to ‘preserve 
the strategic balance within Europe’ more generally.60 With its military 
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and, especially, in Kos-
ovo in 1999, NATO demonstrated its willingness (if not necessarily 
readiness) to take on a role ‘out of area’, in the broader Euro-Atlantic 
region. This was manifested in the adoption of the revised strategic 
concept at the NATO Summit on 25 April 1999 in Washington, while 
the air bombings of Kosovo were still ongoing.  
 
Similarly, the 21st century has seen major changes in the European and 
transatlantic political and security environment, which must be ex-
pected to affect the basis for Atlanticism in NATO and as part of the 
security identity of its members. Starting with the European dimension 
of Atlanticism, the gradual emergence of the EU as a security actor 
since the early 1990s has clearly impacted on Atlanticism. In recent 
years, the EU has acquired capabilities enabling it to take on a more 
active role in security and defence. While the capabilities in the EU 
toolbox continue to be mainly of a ‘soft’ character, the EU has also 
developed military capabilities of its own, has launched autonomous 
EU operations and is currently in the process of developing a Euro-
pean strategic culture.61 Yet, NATO undoubtedly remains the military 
                                                 
60  NATO (1991) ‘The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept’, Rome, 7-8 November. 
61  The Helsinki Headline Goal 2010 was adopted in 2004, and EU force catalogues 
and capability conferences are updating EU’s access to capabilities on a regular 
basis. On military capabilities and operations, see ; Howorth, Jolyon (2007) Se-
curity and Defence Policy in the European Union, Baskingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan Ltd. On strategic culture, see Rynning, Sten (2003) ‘The European 
Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’ Security Dialogue. Vol. 34, No. 4.; 
Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin (2007) ‘European Strategic Culture Revisited: 
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big brother of the two. Although NATO officials as well as US offi-
cials have taken care to emphasize that NATO and the EU should not 
develop competing structures and capabilities, the two organizations 
have been seen to duplicate each other’s efforts.62 The Berlin Plus 
agreement between the two organizations allows the EU to draw on 
NATO resources in operations, but only when NATO as a whole does 
not wish to take action.63 Disagreements over non-EU members in 
NATO (read: Turkey) and non-NATO members in the EU (read: Cy-
prus) act to hamper cooperation between the two organizations.64 
 
Notably, the Berlin Plus has so far only been effectuated twice.65 In-
asmuch as the EU’s emergence as a more credible security actor chal-
lenges the role of NATO and creates internal debates in both organiza-
tions, it can be said to represent a challenge to the future role of Atlan-
ticism – both at the institutional level and in the security identity of 
specific European countries. 
 
Second, when it comes to historical bonds with the United States, the 
changes in US foreign policy after 2000, including the launch of the 
global ‘War on Terror’ and the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
have undoubtedly affected Atlanticism in Europe. In response to the 
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September 
2001, the North Atlantic Council invoked NATO’s Article 5 for the 
first time in the history of the Alliance, in solidarity with the United 
States. Yet, when the Bush Administration decided to intervene mili-
tarily in Afghanistan,66 it did not take up on NATO’s offer, instead ini-
tiating a ‘coalition of the willing’ that took action in the operation 
called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This incident aroused a 
                                                 
The Ends and Means of a Militarised European Union’, Defence and Security 
Studies. Vol. 1, No. 3. 
62  US Defense Secretary Madeleine Albright famously expressed the United 
States’ reservations on the ESDP as the three D’s: ensuring no diminution of 
NATO, no discrimination against non-EU NATO members, and no duplication 
of capabilities. See Albright, Madeleine (1998) ‘The Right Balance Will Secure 
Nato’s Future’, Financial Times, 7 December. In a 2006 speech, however, 
NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer noted that ‘for institutional, po-
litical and technical reasons’, NATO and the EU were ‘working past each other’ 
and ‘duplicating each other’s efforts’. Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop (2006) ‘Speech 
Given at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy’, Speech, Munich, 4 
February. 
63  EU and NATO (2002) ‘European Union - Nato Declaration on Esdp’, Brussels, 
16 December. 
64  The political stalemate over Cyprus has hampered the monthly meetings be-
tween the EU Political and Security Committee and NATO. 
65  In Macedonia (2003) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004–present). 
66  Afghanistan was identified as the state believed to harbour the terrorists behind 
the attack, notably Al Qaeda’s assumed leader Osama bin Laden 
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political crisis in NATO concerning its relevance as a security organi-
zation and function as the key arena for transatlantic security coopera-
tion. The main premise for Atlanticism – the US commitment to the 
transatlantic security community – was once again questioned, as it 
had been in the immediate years after the Cold War.  
 
Later in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a 
multinational force authorized by the UN Security Council, became 
operational on the ground. In August 2003, NATO took over institu-
tional responsibility for this operation. To date, all the NATO allies as 
well as several non-NATO countries have contributed troops to the 
operation. As of July 2009, ISAF encompasses some 65,000 military 
troops, making it NATO’s largest-ever operation.67 The operation in 
Afghanistan has revealed many challenges for NATO as a security ac-
tor, including the need for a more comprehensive approach to crisis 
management and to improve cooperation with other actors present in 
the field (especially the EU and the UN, but also non-governmental 
actors).  
 
The US-led intervention of Iraq in 2003 became an even more momen-
tous point of conflict for US–European relations and Atlanticism. The 
hefty transatlantic and internal European disagreements in the prelude 
to the war became a test to the unity of NATO as a security actor as 
well as to the future of Atlanticism. Seven long-term NATO members, 
among them Britain and Denmark, supported the US-led invasion,68 
whereas four others strongly opposed it.69 Other long-term NATO 
members such as Norway were against the invasion, but remained less 
outspoken in their criticism of US policy. This split among European 
countries formed the backdrop for US Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld’s famous distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe,70 as 
well as claims that the Iraq crisis had led to ‘an effective end of Atlan-
ticism’.71 It is no exaggeration to say that, during the years of the Bush 
                                                 
67  http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf 
68  The other five were Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. All these 
countries were listed as coalition partners by the United States in a press release 
of 27 March 2003. Furthermore, the state leaders of Britain, Denmark, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain signed a public declaration calling for the disarmament of 
Iraq and expressing their support to the United States. See Aznar, José Maria et 
al. (2003) ‘Letter of Eight’, The Times, 30 January. 
69  See Belgium, France, and Germany (2003) ‘Joint Statement on Iraq’, Brussels, 
16 February. 
70  Referring to the disagreements over Iraq, Rumsfeld pointed out that he consid-
ered Germany and France to be part of ‘old’ Europe, whereas the US allies in 
Iraq represented ‘new’ Europe. See Rumsfeld, Donald (2003) ‘Briefing at the 
Foreign Press Center ‘, Washington D.C., 22 January.  
71  Daalder ‘The End of Atlanticism’. 
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administration, relations between the United States and key European 
partners became historically strained. 
 
Finally, when it comes to the geographical dimension of Atlanticism, 
Europe and NATO’s relations with the former East Bloc have re-
mained a central issue after the Cold War. NATO’s enlargement from 
16 to 28 member-states since 1999, most of them former members of 
the Warsaw Pact, can be seen to have altered the collective identity of 
NATO.72  At the same time, many of these new NATO members ap-
pear to have become ‘reflex Atlanticists’,73 in that their Communist 
pasts seem to encourage an active orientation towards the United 
States in their current security policies. This was notable in the prelude 
to the Iraq war, where several of these countries sided with the United 
States. At present, NATO also has 22 partner countries in the broader 
Euro–Atlantic partnership, some of which have expressed a clear in-
terest in full NATO membership.74 
 
NATO has also been an important forum for integrating Russia into 
Western security cooperation structures, and the prospects for a close 
partnership appeared quite good in the 1990s.75 The NATO–Russia 
Council was created in 2003 as a forum for cooperation, consultation 
and dialogue. Since then, however, issues such as NATO enlargement, 
Kosovo’s independent status, US missile defence in Europe and the 
Russian-Georgian conflict have contributed to obstructing NATO-
Russia relations. As a direct result of the latter conflict, NATO froze 
its cooperation with Russia, to which Russia responded by putting all 
bilateral defence collaboration between the two on hold (except for 
certain lower-level contacts).76 Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE 
Treaty, which regulates the military presence on the ground, ensures 
                                                 
72  The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined in 1999, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004. In April 2009, Al-
bania and Croatia became new members. 
73  Following Menon and Lipkin European Attitudes Towards Transatlantic Rela-
tions 2000-2003: An Analytical Survey. 
74  At the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on 2–3 December 2008, the decision 
on whether Ukraine and Georgia should become part of NATO’s Membership 
Action Plans (MAP) was postponed. The United States pressured for an upgrad-
ing of these countries’ status and for granting them MAP status, but this was not 
accommodated by the majority of NATO countries. 
75  Borko, Yuriy (1997) ‘Possible Scenarios for Geopolitical Shifts in Russian-
European Relations’, in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev, and Victoria Ingrid Einagel, 
(eds.) Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, Territory and Identity. Lon-
don: Sage; Pouliot, Vincent (2008) ‘Security Communities in Practice: The 
Symbolic Power Politics of Nato-Russia Diplomacy’, D.Phil thesis, Toronto, 
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. 
76  The EU responded by putting negotiations with Russia about a renewal of the 
existing cooperation agreement on hold, but re-opened them in December 2008.  
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mutual inspections etc., has further reduced the number of common 
arenas for cooperation and dialogue. According to Oksana Antonenko, 
the NATO–Russia Council is filled with process but little substance 
and is therefore of little value to Russia.77 Russian analysts and politi-
cians alike have stressed that Russia considers itself a strategic partner 
to NATO and that future cooperation as seen from Russia needs to be 
based on recognition of this. The substance of being a ‘strategic part-
ner’ is not easily definable, but it signals that Russia wants to be seen 
as an equal partner to NATO and not merely as part of a cooperative 
structure.78 NATO and Russia agreed to re-open their cooperation in 
late January 2009. In his first press conference, the new NATO Secre-
tary General stressed the importance of developing a true strategic 
partnership with Russia and of extending practical cooperation.79  
 
While it is difficult to generalize on the basis of one conflict, and espe-
cially of the kind in Georgia, the conflict has nevertheless triggered 
substantial debates about NATO’s relevance and role towards Russia. 
Above all, it demonstrated that Russia is capable and willing to use 
military force to pursue its political goals, irrespective of international 
law and despite protests from the international community at large and 
NATO. At the same time, it represents a challenge to legitimacy and 
trust, if the West conducts a policy towards Russia where cooperation 
fora like the NRC are open only as long as Russia behaves in a manner 
that pleases NATO. These fora could be particularly useful for dis-
cussing difficult and controversial issues.80 Whatever happens in the 
future, relations with Russia have been a recurrent key dimension of 
Atlanticism – its geopolitical dimension in particular. 
 
In sum, various developments and events in the 21st century have in-
fluenced the international political climate and affected the premises 
for Atlanticism within NATO as well as in the security identities and 
practices of NATO member-states. In the next sections, we explore 
how these changes have impacted on the Atlanticist security identities 
of Britain, Norway and Denmark. 
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3.1 Britain: Steady Atlanticist under pressure 
Despite the changes in international security politics, several of which 
have influenced transatlantic security relations, Britain has remained a 
steady Atlanticist throughout the first decade of the 21st century. 
 
Indications of a change in Britain’s cautious approach to EU security 
policy could be observed from the mid-1990s onwards. Following the 
establishment of the CFSP in 1993, references to ‘Europe’ and ‘the 
EU’ gradually became an integral part of the official British discourse 
on foreign, security and defence policy.81 While Atlanticism continued 
to hold precedence over Europeanism throughout the 1990s, the gov-
ernments of John Major (1990–1997) and, especially, Tony Blair 
(1997–2007) called for a more active approach to Europe, including on 
issues related to security. Jolyon Howorth notes that the international 
failure to deal with the war in Bosnia in the 1990s convinced Major 
that Europe could not depend on the United States to ensure European 
security: ‘some type of European solution had to be found’.82 In 1997, 
Blair and the Labour Party ran for election on a manifesto calling for a 
more active approach to Europe. Blair’s signature tune as prime minis-
ter was that Britain did not have to choose between its allies in Europe 
and the United States. Instead, Blair envisioned that Britain could act 
as a bridge across the Atlantic, and that the two relationships could 
reinforce one another.83 This approach to British security and defence, 
Timothy Garton Ash suggests, could perhaps be described as a case of 
‘Euroatlanticism’.84 
 
In 1998, however, the outbreak of the Kosovo war put Britain’s middle 
position between Europe and the United States under pressure. Blair 
soon marked himself as a strong advocate of international intervention 
in Kosovo, based on values rather than national interests.85 His key 
ally, however, US President Bill Clinton, was initially more aloof, es-
pecially on the question of committing US ground troops to the area 
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following NATO’s air bombings.86 Reportedly, the debates over Kos-
ovo were a major reason why Blair in 1998 called for a more active 
British approach to the EU’s plans for security and defence.87 Britain, 
he concluded, would have to be a player in Europe and not just an ob-
server.88 In 1998, his words were followed up by concrete action. In a 
historic joint declaration, France and Britain stated that the EU needed 
‘strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to new risks’ and be 
able to act autonomously in response to international crises.89 The dec-
laration made possible the establishment of the ESDP within the struc-
tures of the EU. Arguably, it also marked the beginning of a more 
hands-on British approach to European security and defence. In 1999, 
Blair noted that  
 
 We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every 
disorder in our own back yard. The European Union should be able to take on 
some security tasks on our own, and we will do better through a common Euro-
pean effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own.90 
 
At the same time, he took care to emphasize that the ESDP would 
merely play a complementary role to that of NATO. In other words, 
Britain’s identity as an Atlanticist first and Europeanist second had not 
changed. 
 
Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC in 
2001, Britain demonstrated its unyielding loyalty the United States. 
Both in the immediate response and in the subsequently launched ‘War 
on Terror’, the Blair government kept its promise to ‘stand shoulder to 
shoulder’ with the United States.91 Britain contributed with personnel 
and equipment at all operational levels to the US-led Operation Endur-
ing Freedom in Afghanistan, and has also been a steadfast contributor 
of troops to ISAF (second only to the United States). As of July 2009, 
the British contribution to ISAF encompassed some 9,000 troops, with 
the majority deployed to the turbulent south.92 
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The weightiest proof of Britain’s deep-seated Atlanticist orientation 
and loyalty to the United States, however, is still Blair’s support to 
George W. Bush over the Iraq war. Christopher Hill notes that Blair 
was ‘willing to sacrifice the support of many other parties, at home 
and abroad’ to support the United States, notwithstanding his own re-
ported preference for the ‘UN route’.93 In March and April 2003, the 
British contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom encompassed some 
46,000 military personnel, the last of whom left in July 2009.94 
 
The transatlantic and European controversies over Iraq put Blair’s new 
approach to Europe and partnership with Jacques Chirac to the test.95 
As pointed out by Ash, it was once again on the European side that the 
transatlantic ‘Blair bridge project’ collapsed.96 Blair also faced severe 
criticism over the Iraq issue at home – not only from the British press 
and public, but also from colleagues inside the Labour party and in his 
own government.97 In the end, the Iraq war was a major reason for 
Blair’s resigning in 2007. When Gordon Brown took over, he signalled 
that his was ‘a new government with new priorities’.98 The appoint-
ment of a foreign minister who reportedly had opposed the Iraq war 
privately; diplomatic visits to Paris and Berlin before going to Wash-
ington DC and Brown’s avoidance of the phrase ‘special relationship’ 
at his first press conference with Bush, were factors indicating that this 
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statement included Britain’s image as a fixed Atlanticist.99 Two years 
later, it seems clear that the British security identity has not changed 
substantially. Brown quickly returned to the ‘special relationship’ 
phrase in meetings with Bush, and the 2008 British National Security 
Strategy confirmed the position of the United States as Britain’s single 
most important bilateral partner, ‘including through its engagement in 
NATO’.100 For Brown, Britain’s withdrawal of troops from Iraq and 
the change from Bush to Obama have undoubtedly lowered, if not re-
versed, the costs of enjoying close relations with Washington.101 Al-
though some commentators claim to have observed a lack of interest in 
Britain on Obama’s part, both sides have insisted that the special rela-
tionship remains strong.102  
 
The geographical dimension of British Atlanticism also continues to 
be relevant, albeit in a somewhat different manner. The current British 
security and defence discourse focuses less on the security implica-
tions of the country’s geographical location, as the risk of a military 
attack on British soil is deemed ‘very low’.103 Instead, Britain has 
shifted its focus towards a wider definition of security, when it comes 
to the nature of threats as well as the geographical radius of concern. 
Official documents repeatedly point out that national security involves 
more than freedom from military threats alone, and that security ‘at 
home’ is inextricably linked with security ‘overseas’.104 In NATO, 
Britain advocates the view that NATO operations ‘out of area’ and op-
erations as defined in Article 5 are two sides of the same coin (see be-
low).  
 
In a geopolitical context, it is worth noting that Britain’s relations with 
Russia have become noticeably strained in recent years. The two coun-
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tries experienced a diplomatic crisis during the summer of 2007 when 
Russia refused to extradite the man suspected of the murder of a for-
mer Russian agent, Alexandr Litvinenko, in London. Following Rus-
sia’s refusal to hand over the suspect, and allegations that Russian au-
thorities had approved of the assassination, the British government ex-
pelled four diplomats from London. Russia responded by expelling 
four British diplomats from Moscow and by closing down British 
Council offices in Russia. As a direct consequence of these events, 
British–Russian diplomatic relations were reported to be at their low-
est point since the end of the Cold War. British–Russian intelligence 
cooperation on counter-terrorism was effectively frozen, and accusa-
tions of state espionage have been made on both sides.105 In July 2008, 
The Times reported that ‘British security services have identified 
Russia as the third most serious threat facing the country’, preceded 
only by Al Qaida and Iran.106 Moreover, the British government was a 
strong critic of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008.107 
Recently, the British Foreign Secretary noted ‘a clear deficit of trust’ 
in the relations between Russia and the West.108 The complication of 
British–Russian relations is, potentially, a factor that could reinforce 
the geopolitical dimension of Britain’s Atlanticism. 
 
In sum, it could be argued that while Atlanticism remains a key pillar 
of the British security identity, its contents have been modified. The 
narrative of Britain as a ‘reluctant European’ is less valid than before, 
and its position as an island in the Atlantic Sea, physically discon-
nected from the European continent, matters less to the formulation of 
its security policy. At the same time, the ‘special’ US–British relation-
ship endures, despite analysts and observers’ repeated observations 
and/or predictions of their death. Similarly, NATO’s position as the 
cornerstone of British defence has been maintained, but Britain also 
takes part in military operations outside NATO structures.109 Argua-
bly, a key marker of present-day British Atlanticism is its contribution 
of troops not only to NATO-led operations, but also to US-led opera-
tions outside the structures of NATO. 
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3.2 Norway: Still a steady Atlanticist  
Norway has a genuine and long-standing Atlanticist orientation in se-
curity and defence policy, manifested in its close relationship with the 
United States and its strong commitment to NATO. NATO is the cor-
nerstone of Norwegian security, so maintaining NATO’s relevance for 
European security is a key security concern for Norway. The Norwe-
gian defence reform, which has been controversial at home, has been 
conduced and justified largely with reference to NATO’s ongoing 
military transformation as well as alleged expectations from Norway’s 
allies.110 As expressed in the Defence Plan for the period 2005–2008: 
 
 Norway’s most important contribution in this respect [to maintaining NATO’s 
relevance] will be to follow up on the allied intentions realized through the work 
with NRF, a new command structure and PCC, to ensure NATO remains an effi-
cient security political tool seen from both sides of the Atlantic.111  
 
NATO is also the only European arena where Norway participates 
with full membership rights in discussions and decisions about Euro-
pean security and defence with European allies. A NATO that re-
sponds efficiently to security needs and crises may serve to reduce the 
competition from the EU, which seen from a non-EU member’s point 
of view would be favourable. Norwegian concern about marginaliza-
tion vis-à-vis the EU is also founded in concerns that the role of the 
EU in security issues, as well as the European core in NATO, will 
grow stronger. Because the country is not a member of the EU, Nor-
wegian governments work hard to keep security and defence issues 
within NATO and – where this is not possible – to obtain the best pos-
sible access to the ESDP.112 As part of this anti-marginalization policy, 
Norway has strongly supported closer EU-NATO cooperation, al-
though the Berlin Plus agreement has been a disappointment. The 
Norwegian government also gave high priority to the negotiations that 
led to the agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 
2006.113 This policy could be seen as a reflection of Atlanticism but 
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also as a practice that contributes to upholding Norway’s Atlanticist 
security policy and identity.  
 
Should NATO be unable to live up to the expectations of its members, 
and especially the United States, then transatlantic relations could be-
come embodied in the EU–US relationship. This problematique has 
popped up on the agenda from time to time. For instance, in 2005 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder claimed that NATO was no 
longer the primary arena for transatlantic consultations and coordina-
tion, and called for reform of Europe–US relations.114 The Norwegian 
foreign minister at the time stressed the negative consequences for 
Norway, should such a development materialize: 
 
 […] an axis between Washington and Brussels within security policy [would] 
mean[s] that the four NATO countries, which stand outside [the EU] . . . fall 
completely on the sideline in the efforts to put their mark on this transatlantic co-
operation. It means a further marginalization of Norway.115  
 
So far, closer cooperation across the Atlantic (for instance, in the wake 
of the terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 and Europe in 
2004) has not strengthened the EU at the expense of NATO. However, 
closer US–EU cooperation is on the foreign policy agenda of the 
Obama Administration and developments are expected.116 Hence, the 
spectre of marginalization has also become visible in relation to 
NATO. Norway has been working hard to prevent NATO from ‘de-
veloping into a forum that confirms the agreement that has already 
been reached in other and more closed fora’.117 This is also a typical 
small-state concern. In the context of NATO, greater use of ‘coalitions 
of the willing’ could, over time, turn NATO into such a forum, mar-
ginalizing the influence of smaller members like Norway. It is also a 
considerable challenge for NATO itself, should the alliance become a 
‘force pool’ for members that seek to avoid the pitfalls of and time-
consuming consensus processes in NATO.118 Schreer and Noetzel ar-
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gue that NATO has already embarked on this way and has developed 
from a ‘two-tier NATO’ into a fluid ‘multi-tier NATO’.119 To avoid 
disintegration, they argue, NATO should become an ‘alliance à la 
carte’ or introduce the principle of ‘variable geometry’ where consen-
sus is no longer an absolute demand. For Norway, such a development 
would require an even stronger focus on coalition building and alliance 
building than today, and being outside the EU would be a considerable 
disadvantage. Should NATO’s role as a forum for political consulta-
tions be diminished, so would its relevance as a security organization. 
 
The ‘War on Terrorism’ had a direct impact on the transformation and 
use of the Norwegian armed forces in international operations, such as 
the OEF and ISAF. Both politically and militarily, ISAF is Norway’s 
most important international operation, with a contribution of some 
485 personnel.120 The Norwegian government generally presents the 
Norwegian contribution to ISAF as being more substantial than many 
other NATO allies tend to see it.121 Military circles have stressed that 
it is the level of competence, not the sheer number of soldiers de-
ployed, that is the central point (for instance, Norway’s Special Opera-
tions Forces have proven highly attractive to allies in Afghanistan). 
The major part of the Norwegian contingent has been deployed to the 
northern part of Afghanistan, in Meymanah and Mazaar-el-Sharif, as 
well as in Kabul. Since the autumn of 2008, Norway has also covered 
parts of the North Western region, Gormash, which has been marked 
by unrest as well as heavy fighting.  
 
The ISAF operation is controversial in domestic politics in Norway, 
where the geographical location of the Norwegian forces has become a 
key issue. The Norwegian ISAF contribution has on several occasions 
challenged the political unity of the Red/Green coalition government 
in Oslo. One of the coalition parties, the Socialist Left Party, has been 
opposed to the deployment of forces to the southern part of Afghani-
stan. Although justified with reference to an already considerable con-
tribution (in relation to the number of inhabitants in Norway) and lack 
of capacity, Norway’s unwillingness to deploy forces to the South are 
de facto national caveats that may weaken its position in NATO. Ar-
guably, this has also contributed to reducing the goodwill that Norway 
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enjoyed in the years of the Bush administration through its military 
contributions (especially the Special Operations Forces) to Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  
 
As to the other dimension of Norway’s Atlanticism – the relationship 
with the United States – good relations were furthered into the 21st 
century under President Bill Clinton. In the days after 11 September 
2001, the support and commitment expressed by the Norwegian gov-
ernment was firm and unreserved. Norway expressed its moral and 
political support to the United States – ‘our primary ally’, as Defence 
Minister Bjørn Tore Godal put it – as well as Norway’s willingness to 
contribute militarily if needed.122 Norway contributed air support and 
ground personnel to OEF in an early phase.123  
 
However, the international controversy over Iraq also affected the 
Norwegian–US relationship. According to the official position, Nor-
way did not support or participate in the intervention in Iraq in 2003, 
because there was no UN Security Council mandate for the invasion. 
This position showed that Norway’s foreign policy tradition – where 
international law, multilateral cooperation and the UN’s central role in 
international security are seen as vital for long-term security – trumped 
any immediate concerns for its bilateral relations with the United 
States, as well as for Atlanticism. Of course, there were few direct se-
curity risks related to the decision not to participate in the Iraq opera-
tion, and that probably facilitated Norway’s position. Once a UN man-
date was in place, Norway sent an engineer squadron and later also 
staff officers to assist in the rebuilding of post-war Iraq. Although 
Norway was not on the official list of US coalition partners in Iraq, the 
Minister of Defence, Kristin Krohn Devold, stated that Norway was 
‘not neutral’.124 Norway’s contributions and this statement created 
confusion about the country’s position on Iraq. In his 2004 State of the 
Union Address, President George W. Bush included Norway on the 
list of US coalition partners in Iraq.125  
 
The fragile support from the Storting for Norway’s participation in 
post-war Iraq was dealt a serious blow by revelations that the United 
States had fabricated  evidence of Iraq’s ability to produce WMD 
came to the fore in the US hearings. The negative developments on the 
ground in Iraq also put the whole operation into question in parts of 
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the political community. The Norwegian Iraq contribution was brought 
to an end in late 2005, as promised by the Red/Green coalition during 
the election campaign. While the message that Norway did not intend 
to participate in the Iraq invasion in March 2003 had allegedly been 
received with a certain degree of understanding from President George 
W. Bush, Norway’s decision to terminate its troop contributions to 
both OEF and Operation Iraqi Freedom was not.126 The official reason 
for not renewing the Norwegian troop contributions to OEF and the 
staff officers in Iraq was the decision to step up Norway’s military 
contributions to UN operations (especially in Africa) and to NATO 
operations, rather than to ‘coalitions of the willing’.127 Norway also 
wanted to strengthen NATO as a multilateral organization, militarily 
and politically. To this end, Norway would give priority to the ISAF 
operation, and its ‘bilateral cooperation with the United States should 
as a rule go through the alliance’.128 Norwegian government officials 
have stressed that Norway wishes to have good relations with the 
United States and that political disagreement has not altered the long-
standing bilateral ‘special relationship’. However, the view that these 
relations were damaged has often been expressed in non-official set-
tings. For example, that the withdrawal from the US-led operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq is the reason why Norwegian Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg was never invited to the White House during the 
Bush presidency.129 
 
Regarding the geopolitical dimension of Atlanticism, Norway has 
gradually become a firm supporter of NATO enlargement. Concerns 
that Norway could become politically and militarily marginalized, be-
cause NATO’s focus would shift to the East and the South, were often 
expressed in the domestic discourse prior to 1999. Norway has sup-
ported the principle that the alliance should be open to states that qual-
ify, and that this is security through integration. In addition, the major-
ity of the new NATO members also support a strong US presence and 
interest in European security, which strengthens Atlanticism – and that 
is clearly in Norway’s interest.  
 
However, it is also in Norway‘s interest that NATO should have a 
good and workable relationship with Russia. Traditionally, the triangle 
                                                 
126  Ole Berthelsen has claimed that Bush accepted Prime Minister Bondevik’s 
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127  Statsministerens kontor (2005) Plattform for regjeringssamarbeidet mellom Ar-
beiderpartiet, Sosialistisk Venstreparti og Senterpartiet 2005-09 (Soria Moria 
Declaration), see http://www.dep.no/filarkiv/260512/regjeringsplatform.pdf. 
128  State Secretary Espen Barth Eide stated this in an interview with Forsvarsnett 
(www.mil.no) in November 2005. 
129  Interview in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, September 2008. 
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of powers influencing Norwegian security has consisted of 
USSR/Russia, the United States and leading European states. Whereas 
Russia was economically and politically pacified in the 1990s, a recent 
shifting of power patterns has brought old and new constellations of 
powers to the fore again. Current global developments and especially 
Russia’s return as a great power give rise to the question of how Nor-
way should relate to them. How to attract the attention of NATO allies 
towards Norway’s security challenges in the High North has become 
particularly challenging. Energy security was added to the NATO 
mandate only recently, at the NATO Summit in Riga in 2007. Even the 
assumed interest in the High North in an energy context from interna-
tional actors like the EU and the United States appears somewhat ex-
aggerated.130 Similarly, improving NATO’s relationship with Russia 
has de facto priority over NATO enlargement in Norwegian policy. 
This is the main reason – although not the official one – why Norway 
was among the NATO countries that did not support a MAP to 
Ukraine and Georgia at the ministerial meeting in December 2008. Its 
proximity to Russia also partly explains why Norway opposed the US 
plans for a missile defence in Europe in NATO. Establishing and pre-
serving good relations between Russia and the West are simply in 
Norway’s national security interests.  
 
In sum, Norway has retained its strong Atlanticist orientation, its pref-
erence for a close relationship with the United States – despite some 
political controversy – and its firm commitment to NATO. Norwegian 
security concerns have predominantly been related to marginalization, 
not only towards the EU but also within NATO. NATO enlargement, 
the use of ‘coalitions of the willing’ for specific missions and, not 
least, a fluid ‘multi-tier’ alliance based on an ‘alliance à la carte’ are 
trends that seem likely to reduce the impact of smaller NATO coun-
tries like Norway. These developments also represent a threat to 
NATO’s importance as the major arena for transatlantic relations and 
political consultations. For a non-EU country like Norway, and in view 
of heightened Russian military activity in the High North, that would 
be a regrettable development.     
3.3 Denmark: From mainstream to Super Atlanticist 
Denmark’s relationship with the United States and its commitment to 
NATO and Atlanticism has grown stronger in the years since 2000, 
whereas its relationship with the EU within security and defence has 
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remained more or less the same. Starting with the latter, the Danish 
opt-outs from the EDSP mean that Denmark does not take part in the 
drafting, implementing and financing decisions of EU policies within 
defence. These opt-outs from the ESDP also affect national defence 
policy. When the EU took over operations in Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina from NATO, the Danish forces had to be withdrawn. 
Non-participation in the ESDP also means that Denmark is not part of 
the Nordic battle group or the EDA. Consequently, Denmark contrib-
utes with troops only to UN and NATO operations, and to ‘coalitions 
of the willing’ as in Afghanistan and Iraq. To draw a comparison, Brit-
ain has contributed financing and personnel to ESDP operations since 
2003, and non-EU member Norway has participated in EU-led opera-
tions, as well as in the Nordic battle group and in the EDA.  
 
Denmark opted out of the ESDP on grounds of wanting to preserve its 
national autonomy. However, in a recently published report that has 
attracted considerable attention in Danish politics, analysts claim that 
the opt-out ‘is judged to limit Danish freedom of action more than pro-
tect Danish autonomy’.131 For example, even if Denmark were partici-
pating in the ESDP, the Danish Parliament (the Folketing) would have 
the right to decide on the country’s involvement, including the de-
ployment of forces to an EU-led operation, and could even veto such 
operations. Denmark’s policy seems to be one of active participation 
within the limits set by the opt-outs, a strategy similar to that of Nor-
way. For both countries, such a policy of autonomy entails that neither 
is entitled to veto against the further development of the military di-
mension of the ESDP – including the creation of a European army, 
should the (other) EU member-states agree on such a development. 
 
Denmark’s influence on the civilian dimension of ESDP remains in-
tact, so the country is able to influence the conceptual concretization of 
the security strategy – at least in principle. However, the ‘whole of 
government’ (EU) or ‘comprehensive approach’ (NATO), in which 
civilian and military aspects are seen as a whole, puts this influence 
into question, according to the 2009 DIIS report (in ch. 2.3.4). Inter-
preting the opt-outs in relation to specific tasks and in the ESDP mili-
tary institutions (like the Military Committee and Military Staff) is be-
coming more and more challenging as the ESDP develops, the report 
argues (ch. 2.1.1).  
 
The opt-outs also affect Denmark when acting in the capacity of EU 
Presidency. This position is generally seen as a valuable opportunity 
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2009. Report commissioned from the Danish Parliament in November 2007.  
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for the smaller member-states to exert influence on EU positions and 
policy. However, during Denmark’s EU presidency in 2002, the in-
coming presidency (Greece) had to step in when the EU discussed 
military and defence issues. The authors of the DIIS report argue that 
if the opt-outs – including those regarding the European Monetary Un-
ion, Union citizenship and Justice and Home Affairs – remain intact, 
they are likely to render the Danish EU Presidency in 2012 difficult. 
The main reason is that the context for the EU opt-outs has changed 
considerably since 1993, with extensive changes at the global Euro-
pean and national levels, including changes in the EU’s political 
agenda (the EU’s military role not least).132  
 
With regard to Denmark’s relationship with the United States, the 
mainstream Atlanticism in Danish foreign policy of the 1990s (as in 
Britain and Poland) was replaced by Super Atlanticism after the turn 
of the century and especially after the events of 9/11.133 ‘Super Atlan-
ticism’ implies that Denmark has supported even controversial US for-
eign policy like the Iraq war in 2003. Denmark signed the ‘letter of the 
eight’ and participated with troops to the Anglo-American ‘coalition of 
the willing’. 
  
Denmark’s Super Atlanticism has manifested itself in considerable 
troop contributions to the US-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
where Danish soldiers have been deployed to the violent Helmand 
province in the South, as well as in an acceptance of military losses 
that could be unthinkable in the Norwegian domestic context (or in 
Sweden, for that matter). Given Denmark’s traditional UN ideology 
and the increased risk of exposing Denmark and Danish citizens to 
possible terrorist attacks this is surprising, according to Hans 
Mouritzen. The new Danish activist policy could be seen as a funda-
mental breach with Denmark’s passive foreign policy of the past and 
‘footnote policy’ in NATO, and a demonstration of the country’s will-
ingness and moral obligation to defend shared values together with its 
allies.134 As noted by the Danish foreign minister, the United States 
remains ‘the fundamental alliance partner […], whose values and 
global democratic goals we share, even if there from time to time can 
be disagreement about strategy and methods.’135 According to the min-
                                                 
132  Ibid. 
133  Mouritzen ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’. 
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ister, a transatlantic split, on the other hand, may strengthen counter 
forces, which is not in the security interest of Denmark.  
 
Denmark attaches great importance to the transatlantic relationship, 
which manifests itself in NATO on a daily basis.136 The commitment 
to NATO and the United States is also reflected in Denmark’s contri-
bution to ISAF. As of 12 January 2009, the Danish contribution to 
ISAF was approximately 700 troops (as compared with 490 troops 
from Norway). Denmark’s primary contribution is and will continue to 
be a flexible battalion group under Task Force Helmand.137  While 
Denmark has suffered considerable losses in Afghanistan, the govern-
ment has been firm on its commitment to ISAF. With the new Obama 
administration in Washington, Denmark’s Super Atlanticism may find 
expression through a greater push for enhanced EU–US cooperation in 
strategic areas, as well as extended bilateral Danish–US coopera-
tion.138 Domestically, continued Super Atlanticism is likely to become 
less controversial among the Danish general public now than during 
the years of the Bush administration.  
 
Regarding the geopolitical dimension of Atlanticism, Denmark has 
been a firm supporter of NATO enlargement and a ‘Europe whole and 
free’, including a stronger relationship with current and new part-
ners.139 This is also in line with US policy on NATO enlargement.140 
At the same time, Denmark – like Norway – is also aware of the po-
tential marginalization risks involved in further enlargement, of both 
NATO and the EU. Denmark’s response to the potential consequences 
for national security of a multi- or non-polar international system has 
been less territorially focused than Norway’s. While Denmark does not 
share a border with Russia, it has interests in the High North because 
of Greenland. Denmark’s emphasis on ‘core areas and tasks’ is never-
theless far more implicit than that of its Nordic neighbour.  
 
In sum, Super Atlanticism is expected to become less controversial in 
Denmark with the Obama presidency than during the Bush years. Re-
garding the EU, current debates in Denmark indicate that the opt-out 
from the CFSP/ESDP may soon be re-evaluated as part of the coun-
try’s anti-marginalization policy. All the same, NATO is likely to re-
main the core in Denmark’s security and defence policy. 
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4. Atlanticism and the new strategic 
concept 
Indications as to the future of Atlanticism in NATO and as part of 
member-states’ security identities might perhaps be extracted from the 
early discussions on the revision of NATO’s strategic concept. NATO 
has issued six strategic concepts since 1946 – some the result of long 
and demanding processes, and others after more straightforward nego-
tiations. The organization’s current strategic concept was adopted in 
1999, with a revised concept scheduled for adoption at the NATO 
Summit in Lisbon in late 2010. 
 
Strategic concepts identify potential threats to the NATO countries, 
and suggest how to approach and deter them militarily. There is typi-
cally a political section describing the overall strategic landscape and 
challenges, including the ‘Fundamental Security Tasks’; and a military 
section outlining the implications for the armed forces of NATO 
members.141 As such, the concept could be seen as a core document or 
working programme for NATO and its members, also establishing and 
reflecting the transatlantic consensus. An important function of the 
strategic concept is to formalize decisions and communiqués previ-
ously issued, as well as practices that have emerged since the previous 
revision. As noted by the new NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, 
 
 Since the last Strategic Concept was adopted, 10 years ago, [NATO] has almost 
doubled in size and taken on missions and threats no one could have imagined at 
the time. The moment has come for the theory to catch up with the practice, and 
for all the members of the Alliance, old and new, to chart a common way 
forward. And that is what we’ll do.142. 
 
In line with the ‘Declaration of Alliance security’ of April 2009, the 
Secretary General has appointed an expert group of twelve people 
who, in consultation with the member states, will prepare the ground 
for the new strategic concept. The group is chaired by former US Sec-
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retary of State, Madeleine Albright.143 The process that leads to a new 
strategic concept will have three phases: the reflection phase, the con-
sultation phase and the drafting and final negotiation phase. NATO is 
currently in the reflection phase and, hence, it is still too early to tell 
what the revised strategic concept will look like. Some of the discus-
sion points raised at an early stage, before the NATO Summit in April 
2009 are nevertheless likely to have implications for Atlanticism in 
NATO.144  
 
These early discussions indicated that NATO’s ‘near abroad’ will 
again become important, following what many analysts see as the re-
turn of geopolitics and great-power games. The more forward Russian 
foreign policy – as demonstrated in the conflict with Georgia, the 
sharp increase of regular Russian naval and air activity in the High 
North and the heavy political pressure on Ukraine and Belarus in rela-
tion to the conflict over Russian gas prices – indicates a return to geo-
politics. This is potentially bad news for small and medium-sized 
states like Norway and Denmark. In a constitutional order based on the 
rule of law and binding institutions, small states may appeal to interna-
tional norms, rules and practices, should they become subject to politi-
cal and/or military pressure from other states. International organiza-
tions play an important role in such a system by restricting states’ le-
gitimate use of power and, hence, their room for manoeuvre. Although 
imposing sanctions on countries that do not respect the rules of the 
system may be difficult, the political costs paid by an aggressor 
through shaming and other reputational mechanisms may at least en-
courage norm compliance.145 Ad hoc diplomatic arrangements between 
great powers, informal institutions like the 19th century Concert of 
Europe, a hegemonic order or geopolitics on the other hand, generally 
reduce the political space for small states.146 The Russian–Georgian 
                                                 
143  NATO (2009) ‘Declaration on Alliance Security’, Strasbourg/Kehl, 4 April. 
Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg was among those heads of states at 
the Kehl/Strasbourg NATO Summit who stressed the role of NATO ambassa-
dors and, hence, all NATO members, in the work on the strategic concept.  
144  To engage the wider public and make the process as inclusive as possible NATO 
has created a discussion forum on its homepage where people can offer their 
opinions on the future strategic concept. See http://natostratcon.info/forum/. 
145  Schimmelfennig, Frank (1999) ‘The Double Puzzle of EU Enlargement. Liberal 
Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Decision to Expand to the East’, Oslo, 
ARENA/University of Oslo. 
146  Wivel, Anders (2005) ‘The Security Challenges of Small EU Member States: 
Interests, Identity and the Development of the EU as a Security Actor’, Journal 
of Common Market Studies. Vol. 43, No. 2. For an analysis of the theory and 
history of the Concert of Europe, see Carsten Holbraad (1970) The Concert of 
Europe. A Study of British and German International Theory 1815-1914. Lon-
don: Longman Group Ltd. Different varieties of order among states are analysed 
in G. John Ikenberry (2001) After Victory. Institutions, strategic restraint, and 
 
The revival of Atlanticism in NATO: Changing security identities in Britain, Norway and Denmark  49 
conflict could at least be seen as an illustration of the geopolitical view 
that great powers live by different rules than other states and have 
‘spheres of influence’.  
 
To a large degree, the preliminary debate on NATO’s strategic concept 
reflects the changes in the international political system where inter-
state conflicts have returned to the agenda. This is undoubtedly putting 
NATO’s operational and political capabilities to new tests. With re-
gard to tasks and missions, some have argued for a revised strategic 
concept that can ensure a better balance between NATO’s ends and 
means, calling for ‘a scaling back of NATO ambitions in line with its 
political will and military capability’.147 Briefly, this line of thought is 
built on two basic premises. First, as a military alliance, there are clear 
limits to what NATO can and should do; consequently, NATO should 
try to integrate its actions with those of (other) international actors. 
Second, outside NATO, the alliance is by many seen as the prolonged 
arm of ‘the West’ and of a Western security agenda. As pointed out by 
Mats Berdal and David Ucko, some states also view NATO as an in-
strument of US foreign (and hegemonic) policies. To counter such atti-
tudes, they argue, NATO should focus more on stabilization and wider 
peacekeeping operations in the future. This would include the provi-
sion, assistance and coordination of capacities such as headquarters in 
the field, strategic lift capacity, logistics support and other specialized 
units, security sector reform and, finally, rapid reaction forces.148 
Views differ within NATO between those who want the alliance to 
continue to focus on its global role, and, on the other hand, those who 
want NATO to ‘come back to Europe’ or at least to its ‘core areas and 
tasks’. These differences are also reflected in the preliminary debates 
about the new strategic concept in Britain, Norway and Denmark. 
4.1 British priorities for the new strategic concept  
As one of the most influential member states in NATO, politically and 
militarily, Britain’s viewpoints must be expected to weigh heavy in 
discussions over the new strategic concept. The British point of depar-
ture has been that the timing is right for a new or revised strategic con-
cept, in order to incorporate lessons learned and prepare NATO for 
new threats and challenges.149 Britain’s principal position has been that 
NATO’s global role should be at the centre of the new strategic con-
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cept, and that this should be seen as an extension of or supplement to 
Article 5 rather than a departure from it.150 According to former De-
fence Secretary, John Hutton, Britain sees the antagonism between 
NATO’s core tasks and areas as defined in Article 5, and its new 
global role, as a constructed one: 
 
 Article 5 remains at the core of the Alliance’s purpose. The notion that providing 
security outside NATO’s boundaries somehow competes with or detracts from 
our responsibilities in this respect is misguided.151 
 
Foreign Secretary Miliband has made a similar observation, noting that 
NATO and the other Europe-based security organizations must be 
ready to address both ‘traditional concerns’ and ‘new global fears’. 
While Article 5 was initially established to secure the territorial bor-
ders of NATO’s member-states, he argues, today’s security environ-
ment ‘demands a more expeditionary and more comprehensive ap-
proach’.152 This mindset was most likely a key reason why Britain ini-
tially responded somewhat unenthusiastically to a Norwegian non-
paper that proposed a return to NATO’s core tasks and areas (see next 
section).153 At the informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in 
Krakow in February 2009, however, Britain seemingly made a turn-
around on this matter,154 signalling a more active approach to the issue 
of NATO’s core areas and tasks. At the meeting, Defence Secretary 
Hutton presented a proposal for the establishment of a NATO rapid 
reaction force of 3,000 troops reserved for the defence of ‘NATO terri-
tory’. The idea would be to ‘underpin NATO’s Article 5 commitment 
to the mutual defence of any member state’. It is noteworthy; however, 
that the rationale offered for establishing such a permanent NATO 
‘homeland security force’ was that it could resolve differences over the 
planned NATO Response Force. Briefly put: some member-states’ 
concerns over national defence issues have prohibited them from 
committing troops to NATO operations, especially in Afghanistan.155 
In view of this, the latest British suggestion can be seen as a compro-
mise, or way of accommodating member-states on both sides in the 
process of revising of NATO’s strategic concept. 
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4.2 Norwegian priorities for the new strategic concept 
The changes in global power patterns – especially with a more self-
confident and ambitious Russia – have potential security implications 
for Norway.156 The threat of invasion may lie in the past, but a possi-
ble scenario, according to Norwegian authorities, could be Russian 
political and military pressure on Norway to enforce a change of its 
policy positions or give in to Russian demands. Consequently, it is ar-
gued, Norway should be able to establish a military threshold that 
would raise the costs of using military power and reduce the room to 
manoeuvre for a potential aggressor.157 In view of increased Russian 
military exercises and tests in the region158, although these have hardly 
been directed against the small Nordic neighbour, the Norwegian de-
fence minister has stressed NATO’s importance to Norway: ‘(…) we 
see that the High North will still be of great strategic importance. This 
underlines NATO’s continued relevance for stability in the North.’159  
 
In the case of a bilateral dispute between Russia and Norway, the role 
of established security structures such as NATO and bilateral partner-
ships is not obvious, however. As noted above, for most other states 
than Russia, the region has remained either marginal or peripheral.160 
A major violent conflict in the region invoking NATO’s Article 5 is 
unlikely for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, NATO has no formal 
role in conflicts or incidents over territorial claims in disputed areas 
where sovereignty has not been permanently established according to 
international law. Should a situation involving a NATO ally occur in 
the disputed areas of the High North, NATO involvement is therefore 
questionable. NATO’s role as a forum for transatlantic political con-
sultations is nevertheless vital to Norway in the case of such an inci-
dent. However, the fact that NATO is being challenged in this capacity 
by the EU and by closer bilateral cooperation between the EU and the 
US, to mention two important challenges, adds to the problem.  
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These concerns constituted the immediate backdrop for Norway’s pre-
liminary position on NATO’s new strategic concept. In a ‘non-paper’ 
sent to all NATO delegations Norway proposed that NATO should 
focus more on its ‘core areas and tasks’, like the security challenges 
already evident in NATO’s core territory. NATO should expand its 
‘situational awareness’ and ‘geographical knowledge’ about the re-
gions in NATO’s periphery on a daily basis. According to the Norwe-
gian view, NATO has a weak profile on alliance territory and on its 
periphery. A stronger focus on NATO territory and the ‘near abroad’ 
would also heighten the relevance and legitimacy of NATO in public 
opinion, the Norwegian government has maintained.  
 
This Norwegian non-paper, also referred to as the ‘near abroad initia-
tive’, was presented as being relevant beyond the High North, includ-
ing in areas like the Black Sea region and the Caspian Sea region. 
However, the initiative was initially supported by countries who share 
the challenges facing Norway in transforming static armed forces to fit 
with ‘out-of-area’ operations, like Greece and Turkey (and Poland). 
The Norwegian initiative was also interpreted as supporting a return to 
Article 5 operations in NATO, since it was presented immediately af-
ter the Russian–Georgian conflict, although that had not been foreseen 
by the government.161 Later, such key NATO countries as Britain, 
Denmark, Germany and the United States also expressed their support 
for the Norwegian initiative.162 The Norwegian ‘near abroad initiative’ 
(non-paper) also speaks to those who argue that NATO should ‘come 
home to Europe’ and reclaim its role as a Euro-Atlantic security or-
ganization, rather than cementing its role as an organization for global 
security. The negative developments and challenges in Afghanistan 
may make such a view more attractive to NATO countries that are suf-
fering casualties in the ISAF operation. The Norwegian government 
has continuously underlined, however, that it fully supports NATO’s 
out-of-area or international operations, and that the focus of the non-
paper is on how to find the right balance between engagements ‘at 
home’ and ‘abroad’. Hence, it is not a question of either/or. The degree 
to which the Norwegian ‘near broad initiative’ manages to impact 
upon the new strategic concept remains to be seen. 
4.3 Danish priorities for the new strategic concept 
While Norway was eager to promote the issue of national defence 
through security in NATO’s ‘near abroad’ on the alliance’s agenda in 
the preliminary discussions about the strategic concept, Denmark 
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seems to have had less at stake regarding territorial security, as noted 
above.  
 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen stood shoulder to shoulder 
with the United States throughout the presidency of George W. Bush, 
including the crisis over Iraq. There is little reason to believe that 
Denmark will choose a different strategy vis-à-vis the United States 
under the present administration. It is the American position that secu-
rity is indivisible, meaning that security at home and security abroad 
are tightly connected.163 And this position is also NATO’s position. In 
his new capacity as NATO Secretary General, Fogh Rasmussen seems 
to promote the Danish view that NATO should strengthen its role 
globally. Hence, NATO should continue to transform the military ca-
pacities of its allies: ‘It is thought-provoking that 70 per cent of the 
armed forces in Europe are stationary. That is a form of inflexibility 
and static military, which does not suit our time’.164 As former PM, 
Fogh Rasmussen has often met with and still has access to the heads of 
state and government in the NATO countries to a degree unprece-
dented among former Secretaries General. He would probably also be 
able to draw on the goodwill he built up vis-à-vis the United States in 
earlier negotiations about the strategic concept. These personal experi-
ences could also prove useful for Danish positions in NATO, insofar 
as Danish alliance policy continues along the policy lines carved out 
by Fogh Rasmussen. 
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5. Conclusion: Atlanticism revisited, 
revived or replaced? 
‘Atlanticism’ as a security identity and orientation must be seen in 
light of structural conditions, central events and the policies of specific 
governments and individual politicians. In recent years, the dynamics 
of the transatlantic security architecture, including the role of Atlanti-
cism, has been challenged both from the outside and from within. This 
report has argued that, despite these major alterations in the transatlan-
tic security landscape, Atlanticism has survived as a security identity 
on the European political arena and within NATO.  
 
The security policies and identities of three long-term NATO members 
examined here – Britain, Norway and Denmark – remain solidly an-
chored in an Atlanticist tradition. From 1945 and throughout the Cold 
War, the Atlanticism of these countries was characterized by their 
geographical location bordering the Atlantic Ocean, their close bonds 
with the United States and their cautious approaches to the process of 
European integration. Since the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of 
the transatlantic security architecture and the role of Atlanticism have 
been challenged both by external and internal developments. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, geopolitics and territorial defence were 
seen as being of less immediate concern to Europe. This, in turn, made 
Atlanticism less topical and less relevant as part of a security strategy. 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, processes and events such as 
NATO’s transformation and ‘out-of-area’ operations, the EU’s emer-
gence as a security actor, EU and NATO enlargement, the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks and the transatlantic rift over Iraq further changed the foun-
dations of Atlanticism in Europe. 
 
Despite these developments, Atlanticism has remained a key pillar of 
British, Norwegian and Danish security identities, as can be seen both 
in discourse and in concrete practices. In the face of growing pressures 
at home and on the European arena, Britain has remained a steady At-
lanticist under the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. 
Similarly, following a tensioning of relations with the United States 
under the years of the George W. Bush administration, Norway now 
appears as a steady and even revitalized Atlanticist within NATO. Fi-
nally, with its firm support to the United States over a controversial 
issue like Iraq, Denmark seems to have strengthened its Atlanticist 
identity further, going from ‘mainstream’ to ‘super’ Atlanticist.  
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The continued existence of Atlanticism could be seen as indication that 
structures like geography, regional power constellations or geopolitics 
and history, including long-term bonds with the United States, play a 
major role in shaping and upholding national security identities. On 
the other hand, it is also worth noting that the contents of Atlanticism 
have been somewhat modified recently, and that geographical location, 
historical bonds with the United States and Euro-scepticism are less 
decisive indicators of Atlanticism than previously. Instead, Atlanticism 
seems increasingly characterized by de facto readiness and ability to 
work together with the United States, and to commit troops and 
equipment to US-led and NATO-led operations. At the time of writing, 
all three countries studied here have continued to provide solid troop 
contributions to NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, ISAF, as they have 
done from the beginning. With the shift in the White House from 
George W. Bush to Barack Obama, there should be even more reason 
to expect a continued Atlanticist orientation for the three countries, 
anchored in strong bilateral relationships with the United States. 
Obama, it has been argued, stands for ‘a more humane, balanced, mul-
tilateral, consultative and diplomatic approach to foreign policy’ than 
his predecessor.165 The new Washington administration also hold 
views that coincide more with those of the EU and individual Euro-
pean states on foreign policy issues where the former administration 
disagreed – including climate change, multilateral cooperation and 
missile defence in Europe. This change of atmosphere is already re-
ported to have eased cooperation within NATO and revitalized some 
of the lost energy of the transatlantic relationship, thereby presumably 
also strengthening the basis for Atlanticism in Europe. 
 
Parallel to this, new global power patterns and the renewed focus on 
great-power politics – including the growing tensions between Russia 
and the West – are factors that could reinforce Atlanticism ‘old style’ 
in Europe and NATO. Interestingly, ongoing discussions over 
NATO’s New Strategic Concept indicate a return to geopolitics as well 
as to the Alliance’s ‘core tasks and areas’. However, there are also in-
dications of somewhat divergent views among Atlanticist states re-
garding NATO’s future role, if not in content then at least in framing. 
While Norway has actively advocated that NATO should focus more 
on its core tasks and areas, including its ‘near abroad’, Britain’s main 
focus has been on developing NATO’s potential to play a global role, 
seeing this as an extension of its Article 5 tasks. The same goes for 
preliminary Danish discussions on the strategic concept, where the fo-
cus on NATO’s defence commitment has been more implicit. 
                                                 
165  Randall, Stephen J. (2008/2009) ‘The American Foreign Policy Transition: 
Barack Obama in Power’, Journal of Military and Srategic Studies. Vol. 11, No. 
1 and 2. 
6. Summary of main findings 
While specific policy implications – for Norway as well as for the 
other country cases – may be difficult to pinpoint at present, our main 
findings can be summed up as follows: 
 
Atlanticism prevails, despite the challenges from an emerging EU se-
curity actor (especially the ESDP) and from an enlarged Euro-Atlantic 
security community. While the latter has created a more heterogeneous 
NATO, several of the new NATO members also seem to contribute to 
a strengthening of Atlanticism. Keeping Atlanticism alive is also im-
portant for maintaining NATO as the primary arena for transatlantic 
relations and consultations. 
 
The election of Barack Obama as US president has contributed to re-
storing transatlantic dialogue and cooperation, thus strengthening the 
basis for Atlanticism in NATO. It has also, however, improved the 
possibilities for strengthening bilateral US–EU relations, which might 
act to remove security-related issues (especially wider security issues) 
from the NATO context. This could prove particularly challenging for 
non-EU states like Norway. 
 
The ‘near abroad’ has returned to NATO’s core agenda after more 
than a decade of absence. Growing tensions between Russia and the 
West, as well as new patterns of global power, have heightened the 
relevance of geopolitics for NATO and for individual member-states. 
These concerns, brought to NATO’s agenda in Norway’s ‘near abroad 
initiative’, are important in the on-going revision of NATO’s strategic 
concept. 
 
The alleged contradiction between NATO’s core tasks and areas as 
defined in Article 5, and its new global role, seems to be one of fram-
ing and rhetoric more than content. Still, Norway will have to work 
hard to keep alive NATO’s new attention to ‘core areas and tasks’ in 
the strategic concept negotiations. 
 
The appointment of former Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Ras-
mussen as new Secretary General in NATO may help to strengthen 
Atlanticism and the transatlantic relationship, given his government’s 
Super Atlanticist orientation over the past eight years. 
 
For Britain, a question is whether NATO should remain its preferred 
forum for international transatlantic security and defence cooperation, 
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or whether ad hoc bilateral and multilateral constellations will increas-
ingly be considered acceptable alternatives. This issue is closely linked 
to developments in Britain’s ‘special’ bilateral relationship with the 
United States, not least in view of the change of leadership in Wash-
ington and the upcoming British elections. 
 
Norway’s biggest challenge in the NATO context will be to attract the 
allies’ attention to what Norway considers as alliance challenges in the 
Northern region (the High North). The Norwegian authorities might 
also want to consider whether a new focus on NATO regions like the 
High North, the Black Sea region and the Mediterranean might have a 
negative aspect as well. One side-effect of such regionalization of se-
curity in NATO might be a strengthening of various ‘clusters’ of coun-
tries within the alliance, which could make coalition and consensus 
building even more demanding than today.  
 
With Barack Obama in the White House, transatlantic relations and 
Atlanticism in general are likely to become ‘normalized’ within the 
Norwegian general public and in the political community. This should 
serve to facilitate the work done by the Norwegian government in the 
NATO context. 
 
